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ABSTRACT
Key Recovery From Decayed Memory Images and Obfuscation of
Cryptographic Algorithms
Roger Zahno
A cold boot attack is a type of side channel attacks which exploit the data remanence
property of Random Access Memory (RAM) to retrieve contents that remain readable for
a short time after power is disconnected. Specialized algorithms have been proposed to
recover cryptographic keys from decayed memory images. However, these techniques were
cipher-dependent and certainly uneasy to develop and to ﬁne tune. On the other hand, for
symmetric ciphers, the relations that have to be satisﬁed between sub-round key bits in the
key schedule always correspond to a set of nonlinear Boolean equations.
In the ﬁrst part of this thesis, we investigate the use of an off-the-shelf SAT solver
(CryptoMiniSat), and an open source Gröbner basis tool (PolyBoRi) to solve the system of
Boolean equations in the algebraic step of the cold boot attack. We also compare the pros
and cons of both approaches and present simulation results for the extraction of AES and
Serpent keys from decayed memory images using these tools.
Because of its simplicity, ease of implementation, and speed, RC4 has become one
of the most widely used software oriented stream ciphers. It is used in several popular
iii
protocols such as SSL and it is integrated into many applications and software such as
Microsoft Windows, Lotus Notes, Oracle Secure SQL and Skype.
In the second part of this thesis, we present an obfuscated implementation of RC4.
In addition to investigating different practical obfuscation techniques that are suitable for
the cipher structure, we also compare the performance of these different techniques. Our
implementation provides a high degree of robustness against attacks from execution envi-
ronments, where the adversary has access to the software implementation, such as in the
case of digital right management applications.
iv
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In today’s computer systems, memory resident data and swap areas contain important in-
formation about current running processes as well as terminated ones. Existing reverse
engineering tools and techniques can be used to search through the Random Access Mem-
ories (RAMs) and swap areas for recoverable secret information such as cryptographic keys
which are left unprotected and directly accessible. In this thesis we investigate the recovery
of the AES [29] and Serpent [13] keys from decayed memory images and present a possible
approach to protect such sensitive data for the case of the RC4 cipher.
Cold boot attacks [33] [34] exploit the data remanence property of RAM to retrieve its
contents which remain readable for a short time after power has been disconnected. At run
time, cryptographic systems such as disk encryption utilities (e.g., Truecrypt [9]) keep the
key information for encryption and decryption in the memory. Retrieving this information
breaks the cryptographic system without directly attacking the underlying cryptographic
primitives in an intensive way. In the ﬁrst part of this thesis, we present a systematic
approach to perform the algebraic step of the cold boot attack against AES and Serpent.
Different approaches that address the cold boot attack were presented in the literatures.
For example, Tresor [8] is a kernel patch for Linux based operating systems which loads
and manipulates key related data directly in the microprocessor and its registers. However,
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in this work, we are interested in a more general approach that can be adapted for other
applications and ciphers. In the second part of the thesis, we present an obfuscated imple-
mentation of RC4. In addition to investigating different practical obfuscation techniques
that are suitable for the cipher structure, we also perform a comparison between the per-
formances of these different techniques. Our implementation provides a high degree of
robustness against attacks from execution environments where the adversary has access to
the software implementation such as in Digital Right Management (DRM) applications.
1.1 Motivation
Techniques to attack cryptographic primitives can be classiﬁed into two main categories:
pure mathematical attacks and side channel attacks. Pure mathematical attacks exploit the
inner structure of the cipher and rely only on known or chosen input-output pairs of the
cryptographic function in order to reveal its secret information. On the other hand, in side
channel attacks, the attacker is assumed to have physical access to the cryptographic device.
Timing information [39] and power consumption [40] are two well known side channels
which can be utilized by attackers to leak critical information related to the secret keys
involved in the cryptographic operations.
The remanence effect of Random Access Memory (RAM) is another highly critical side
channel which exploits the fact that traces of sensitive data remain in the computer memory,
even after its power is removed. Experiments conﬁrming this data remanence property were
reported in 2002 by Skorobogatov [49]. However, Halderman et al. [33] were the ﬁrst to
practically exploit the remanence of memory modules to recover cryptographic keys where
they presented a proof of concept experiment applying a cold boot attack to recover secret
keys of DES, AES and RSA. In contrast to the general belief, Dynamic RAM (DRAM)
retain some of its content for seconds up to several minutes after its power is disconnected
even if the memory module is removed from the motherboard. Cooling the memory module
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can signiﬁcantly extend this time frame.
Several authors (e.g., [51] [12] [34]) further improved Halderman et al.’s proof of con-
cept and presented algorithms for recovering the private keys with higher decay factors.
However, techniques presented by these authors were cipher-dependent and certainly un-
easy to develop and to ﬁne tune. On the other hand, for symmetric ciphers, the relations
that have to be satisﬁed between sub-round key bits in the key schedule always correspond
to a set of nonlinear Boolean equations which lend itself naturally to well studied algebraic
problems such as the SAT problem and the Gröbner basis reduction problem. In this work
we investigate the use of an off-the-shelf SAT solver (CryptoMiniSat [4]), and an open
source Gröbner basis tool (PolyBoRi [16] [5]) to solve the resulting system of Boolean
equations. We also compare the pros and cons of both approaches and present some si-
mulation results for the extraction of AES and Serpent keys from decayed memory images
using these tools.
Software obfuscation addresses the requirements of several recently developed applica-
tions which demand a higher degree of robustness against attacks from the execution envi-
ronment where adversaries have access to the system with its hardware and software imple-
mentation of key instantiated cryptographic functions. DRM is an example for such appli-
cations where one of the main objectives is to control the access to digital contents stored
on different medias. White-box implementations for AES and DES [20] [19], achieve this
by hiding the encryption keys within the implementation of the cipher through the use of
different obfuscation techniques.
Because of its simplicity, ease of implementation and robustness, RC4 [43] has become
one of the most commonly used stream ciphers. In its software form, implementations of
RC4 appear in many protocols such as SSL, TLS, WEP and WPA. Furthermore, it has been
integrated into many applications and software including Windows, Lotus Notes, Oracle
Secure SQL, Apple AOCE, and Skype. Although the core of this two-decade old cipher is
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just a few lines of code, the study of its strengths and weaknesses as well as its different
software and hardware implementation options is still of a great interest to the security and
research communities.
Directly applying the techniques developed for white-box implementation of block ci-
phers to stream ciphers does not seem to work, mainly, because normal operation of stream
ciphers requires us to always maintain the inner state of the cipher. Recovering the inner
state of the stream cipher usually compromises the security of the cipher even if the attacker
is not able to recover the key. In the second part of the thesis, we present an obfuscated
implementation of RC4.
1.2 Contributions
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Application of two off-the-shelf algebraic tools for extraction of cryptographic keys
from corrupted memory images: We investigate the use of an off-the shelf SAT solver
(CryptoMiniSat), and an open source Gröbner basis tool (PolyBoRi) to solve the
system of equations produced by the cold boot attack in order to recover the secret
key. We also provide the pros and cons of both tools and present some experimental
results for the extraction of AES and Serpent keys from decayed memory images.
• An obfuscated implementation of RC4: We investigate several obfuscation tech-
niques that are applicable to array-based stream ciphers such as RC4. We also per-
form a comparison between the performances of these different techniques when
applied to RC4. Although our proposed implementation does not provide the same
level of theoretical security provided by white-box implementations for block ci-
phers, it still provides a high degree of robustness against attacks from execution




The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Relevant background and literature are
brieﬂy reviewed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents our results of applying the CryptoMiniSat
and PolyBoRi for the extraction of AES and Serpent keys from decayed memory images. In
Chapter 4, we present our obfuscated implementation of RC4. Finally, Chapter 5 presents




In this chapter we brieﬂy review some of the background information required for the
understanding of the following two chapters.
2.1 Cryptanalytic Attacks
Cryptanalysis [43] can be deﬁned as the study of methods and techniques that allow unau-
thorized access to secrets protected by cryptographic methods (such as encryption algo-
rithms and signature schemes) and devices. Depending on the assumptions regarding what
is accessible to the cryptanalyst, cryptanalysis models can be classiﬁed into three cate-
gories: Black-box, Grey-box and White-box models.
2.1.1 Black-Box Models
Black-box models offer the least amount of information to adversaries. In particular, in the
black-box model, only input, corresponding output, and the algorithm in use are assumed to
be known by the attacker. No further information about the system implementation details
or inner structure is made available to the adversary. In other words, the black-box model
refers to the traditional cryptanalysis scenario where adversaries can only manipulate the
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input, observe the resulting output, and apply their observations to the cryptographic algo-
rithm in use. Mathematical attacks such as differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanal-
ysis [35] are well known attacks in this model which are applied against block and stream
ciphers. In particular, differential cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack where the adver-
sary knows a set of plaintext (P ) and ciphertext (C) pairs. A ﬁxed ΔP with ΔP = P1⊕P2
is deﬁned (e.g., ΔP = 0000000011010000 for a 16 bit block cipher) so that a speciﬁc out-
put ΔC = C1 ⊕ C2 occurs with a high probability for the given ΔP . The distribution of
ΔC ′s for the given ΔP results into a differential characteristic that reveals bit information
about the key in use. Exhaustive search over the remaining bits of the key accomplishes the
attack [35]. On the other hand, linear cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack where the
adversary knows a set of plaintext (P ) and ciphertext (C) pairs. The idea is to ﬁnd linear
approximations (modulo 2) between some of the P and C bits which hold with probability
0.5± ε. In a fully randomized system, the bias value ε would be almost 0. The expression
to be chosen has to have a high bias value in order to result into a linear characteristic that
reveals bit information about the key in use. Exhaustive search over the remaining bits of
the key completes the attack [35].
2.1.2 Grey-Box Models
In grey-box models, an adversary has some additional information related to the targeted
cryptographic system. In particular, the input, resulting output, the algorithm in use, and
parts of the system to be analyzed are known and accessible by the attacker. Timing anal-
ysis, Power analysis, and Fault analysis are well known side channel representatives for
the grey-box model. Timing analysis and power analysis were ﬁrst introduced by Paul
Kocher [39] [40]. Fault analysis attacks introduced by Boneh et al. [15] provide another
example of this class of attacks.
In timing attacks, the attacker attempts to compromise a cryptosystem by analyzing the
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time needed to execute cryptographic algorithms. Every logical operation in a computer
takes time to execute, and the time can differ based on the input. With precise measure-
ments of the time for each operation, an attacker can work backwards to the secret informa-
tion [39]. Power analysis exploits the correlation between the cryptographic circuit power
consumption and the value of the processed secret information during the execution of dif-
ferent cryptographic operations. Power analysis attacks can be divided into Simple Power
Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). While SPA directly interprets the
measured power consumption, DPA is a more advanced form of power analysis which al-
lows attackers to compute the intermediate values within cryptographic computations by
statistically analyzing data collected from multiple cryptographic operations [40].
Fault analysis exploits the misbehavior of cryptosystems in response to carefully crafted
fault injections. Probably, the best known demonstration of this attack is fault analysis of
RSA cryptosystems which use the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). By manipulating
intermediate results, an adversary can easily ﬁnd the factors of the modulus with the help
of the greatest common divisor Euclidian algorithm [15] [36].
Cold boot attacks are examples of powerful side channel attack which exploit the rema-
nence effect of memory modules. More details about this class of attacks will be described
later on in this chapter.
2.1.3 White-Box Models
In contrast to both the black-box and the grey-box models, in white-box models, an adver-
sary has full access to the system in use. In other words, in a white box model, the input,
resulting output, the algorithm in use, and the whole system are known and accessible. In
particular, the attacker can access and manipulate the memory and other storage devices of
the system, and observe intermediate calculation results.
Because of the ability to access the whole system, in the white-box model, adversaries
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have further techniques at their disposal which extend those already available in the black-
box and grey-box attack models. Additionally, gaining access to the memory and CPU
registers allows the adversary to observe, manipulate intermediate results of the crypto-
graphic evaluations, and access the binary ﬁle for disassembling and debugging the target
programs. This small but incomplete list of examples reveals how powerful an adversary is
in a white-box model. Such powerful attacks demand new approaches to secure secrets on
targeted system.
White-box implementations for AES and DES [20] [19] are designed to resist attacks
launched in a white-box environment. The white-box implementation is a powerful tech-
nique based on software obfuscation. In what follows, we provide a description for the
general idea of white-box implementations. White-box implementations of AES and DES
ciphers are based on lookup tables following a speciﬁc scheme to creates their content.
The rest of this section explains the idea behind these lookup tables and show how they
are related to each other. We start with two deﬁnitions that build the foundation for this
approach.
Deﬁnition 1 (Encoding) Let X be a transformation from m bits to n bits. Choose an m-bit
bijection F and an n-bit bijection G. We call X
′
= G ◦X ◦ F−1 an encoded version of X.
F is an input encoding and G is an output encoding [20].
Deﬁnition 2 (Networked Encoding) A networked encoding for computing Y ◦ X (i.e.
transformation X followed by transformation Y ) is an encoding of the form Y
′ ◦ X ′ =
(H ◦ Y ◦G−1) ◦ (G ◦X ◦ F−1) = H ◦ (Y ◦X) ◦ F−1 [20].
Now consider the case where Y ′ , X ′ are lookup tables representing the different execu-
tion steps. The concatenation Y ◦ X represents the internal computation of Y ′ ◦ X ′ , and
F,G,H are hidden bijections. The lookup tables contain an encoded version of the values
required for each step, i.e., iteration, of the cipher. They are built by concatenating the two
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bijections for input and output encoding and storing the resulting value into the table. In
networked encoding, input and output encoding are designed such that the input encoding
of the following iteration eliminates the effect given by the output encoding.
Following this scheme would result in an encoded cipher with remaining input and out-
put encoding H and F . To eliminate the effect of the resulting input and output encoding,
the ﬁrst and the last lookup table in the chain have to be handled differently. A straightfor-
ward solution applies only one of the two bijections to the two tables, so that in the resulting
computation no input and output encoding occurs. Based on the intended purpose of the
application and the infrastructure in use, different variations might be possible to eliminate
the effects of the input and output encoding. For example, on the transmitter side, one
might have an input that is concatenated with an output encoding related to the input en-
coding of the ﬁrst table, and therefore compensates the effect given by the output encoding.
Applying deﬁnitions 1 and 2, together with the described considerations to eliminate the





2 ◦ · · · ◦X
′
10 = (X1 ◦F−11 )◦ (G2 ◦X2 ◦F−12 )◦ · · · ◦ (G10 ◦X10) = X1 ◦X2 ◦ · · · ◦X10
where X ′r, r = 1, · · · , 10, denotes the lookup table for the rth round with the associated
sub-round keys. Only the bijection F−11 is applied to table X
′
1 to eliminate the effect of
G1. Alternatively, G−11 can be applied to the input so that input ◦ G−11 presents the new
input. In X ′2, ..., X
′
9, both bijections Grd and F
−1
rd are applied. For X
′
10, only bijections G10
is applied to avoid an obfuscated output.
Concatenating the lookup tables X ′1 ◦X ′2 ◦ · · · ◦X ′10 results in the internal computation
X1 ◦X2 ◦ · · · ◦X10 which represent the uncoded AES-128 cipher. In case of the AES-128
cipher, the lookup tables map 128 input bits to 128 output bits. Following a naive approach,
where one table for each iteration of the cipher contains the 128 × 128 bijections from
plaintext to ciphertext for a given key, requires huge tables that cannot be handled by any
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computer system (table size of 5.4 × 1039 bytes [20]).
The structure of AES and DES allows dividing the large sub-round tables into a subset
of tables. In case of AES, four different table types (see Figure 1) are needed to break
down this huge table into roughly 3,100 smaller lookup tables with a total cumulated size







































































Figure 1: Types of tables for an AES white-box implementation [20]
2.2 Cold Boot Attacks
A cold boot attack [33] is a side channel attack that exploits the fact that data loss of a non-
powered random access memory can be delayed by cooling it down. In 2002, Skoroboga-
tov [49] performed some experiments to study the temperature dependency of data retention
time in static RAM devices. The reported experimental results indicated that many chips
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may preserve data for relatively long periods of time at temperatures above −20◦C which
contradicted the common thought that was widely believed at that time. The temperature
at which 80% of the data remained for one minute varied widely between different devices.
While some devices required cooling to at least −50◦C, others, surprisingly, retained data
for this period at room temperature. Memory retention time also varied between devices of
the same type from the same manufacturer, most likely, because controlling data retention
time is not a part of the chip manufacturing quality process. Table 1 presents the evalu-
ated systems and RAM technologies used for the cold boot attack in [33]. Three different
RAM technologies in six different systems were used to form the test probe. System A
works with Synchronous Dynamic Random-Access Memory (SDRAM), the oldest of the
compared RAM technologies. Systems B and C work with Double Data Rate Synchronous
Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DDR SDRAM) and the systems D, E and F work with
Double Data Rate Synchronous Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DDR2 SDRAM) of
the second generation.
Table 2 shows the effect of cooling the memory modules to −50◦C on the percentage
of bit errors compared with uncooled memory modules for systems A to D. As shown in the
table, cooling the memory modules can dramatically reduce the decay effect for a relatively
long time and therefore reduce the expected decay factor. A smaller decay factor increases
the amount of known bits that can be used to launch the algebraic step of a cold boot attack
against the target cryptographic primitive. Thus, one way to launch a cold boot attack is to
remove the memory module, after cooling it, from the target system and immediately plug
it in another system under the adversary’s control. This system is then booted to access
the memory. Another possible approach to execute the attack is to cold boot the target
machine by cycling its power off and then on without letting it shut down properly. Then a
lightweight operating system is, instantly, booted where the content of memory is dumped
to a ﬁle. Further analysis can then be performed on the information that is retrieved from
12
Memory Type Chip Maker Memory Density Make/Model Year
A SDRAM Inﬁneon 128Mb Dell Dimension 4100 1999
B DDR Samsung 512Mb Toshiba Portégé 2001
C DDR Micron 256Mb Dell Inspiron 5100 2003
D DDR2 Inﬁneon 512Mb IBM T43p 2006
E DDR2 Elpida 512Mb IBM x60 2007
F DDR2 Samsung 512Mb Lenovo 3000 N100 2007
Table 1: Test Systems used in [33]
Seconds Error % at Error %
w/o power operating temp. at −50◦C
A 60 41 (no errors)
300 50 0.000095
B 360 50 (no errors)
600 50 0.000036
C 120 41 0.00105
360 42 0.00144
D 40 50 0.025
80 50 0.18
Table 2: Effect of cooling the memory module on the error rates [33]
memory in order to ﬁnd sensitive information such as cryptographic keys or passwords.
2.2.1 Countermeasures
The following list of recommendations, extracted and supplemented from [33], gives an
overview of countermeasures that can be used to defend against cold boot attacks.
• Scrubbing the memory: Do not store cryptographic keys longer than needed in the
memory. Overwrite the keys after their usage and clean the memory during the boot
process (shutdown and boot) by overwriting the memory content.
• Limiting booting from network or removable media: Limit the boot options to boot
only from installed hard disk, which limits the options of an adversary to replace the
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memory modules or the boot medium (hard disk). Protect the BIOS conﬁguration
for unintended changes of the boot options.
• Suspending the system safely: When a computer system is in Sleep mode or Hiber-
nation mode, the memory content must be maintained in a way that allows a quick
reproduction of the running state of the system. When using these modes, encrypt
the memory data during suspension and decrypt the data during the revoke process
after successfully entering the password by the user.
• Avoid auto-mount of encrypted ﬁle systems: Auto-mount of encrypted ﬁle systems
requires the password accessible in the memory even if the ﬁle system is not in use
which contradicts the previously mentioned memory scrubbing recommendation.
• Avoid pre-computation: While pre-computations speed up cryptographic operations,
they require maintaining the key relevant values in the memory. Repeated com-
putation of the key primitives and clearing its values from the memory may hurt
performance. However, it would respect the ﬁrst recommendation in this list.
• Key Expansion: Apply transformations to the keys in the memory to complicate the
reproduction of the keys during a cold boot attack.
• Physical defenses: Limit the physical access to the memory modules. Monitor the
system case and erase the memory content when the case is opened.
• Architectural changes: Change the behavior of the used hardware by designing mem-
ory modules with a smaller remanence and design systems that reset the state of their
modules during shutdown and boot processes.
• Encrypting in the disk controller: The approach used in tresor [8] is to relocate the
computation of key initiated cryptographic functions into the CPU and its debug
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registers or other controllers that are capable of computing and storing cryptographic
keys.
Based on our work developed in chapter 4, software obfuscation can be added to the list
above. Software obfuscation can be seen as a superordinate concept of the key expansion
described above.
2.3 Obfuscation Techniques
Software obfuscation represents a set of techniques to transform a program code or bi-
nary ﬁle into a new secured representation of the program that is hard to read, analyze and
reverse engineer. In this section we brieﬂy review different categories of obfuscation tech-
niques [21]. Obfuscation techniques relay on the transformation of readable information
into a form that is hard to interpret and to reverse engineer. The available techniques highly
depend on the used programming language, the used compiler, the operating system, and
the programming technique (e.g., object-oriented programming vs. structured program-
ming). Desirable properties for such transformations are minimal cost (w.r.t execution time
and program size) and the stealthiness of the obfuscation. Stealthiness is relevant where
only a part of the target program is obfuscated; it prevents adversaries from ﬁnding the
obfuscated code and concentrating their effort on it.
2.3.1 Complicating the Control Flow
The remaining of this section describes several techniques that can be used to complicate
the analysis of control ﬂows by transforming the control ﬂow into a more complex structure
while retaining the intended functionality.
• Opaque expressions: Opaque predicates are opaque expressions evaluated at execu-
tion time. The expected result (always true, always false, or one of them) is known
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in advance during the implementation, but hard to ﬁgure out by an attacker. Simple
examples for this techniques are:
x2 + x mod 2 = 0 always returns true.
x mod 2 = 0 sometimes returns true and sometimes false.
• Flattening the control-ﬂow: Flattening removes the structure of the control ﬂow,
while maintaining the original control ﬂow, with multiple jumps. An example of this
approach is the replacement of a for loop (position 1) with a switch/case structure
(position 2).
1. for(int i = 0; i < 10, i++){...}
2. int i = 0;
while(1){
switch(i) {
case 0 : · · · ; break;
case 1 : · · · ; break;
· · ·
case 9 : · · · ; break;
default : · · · ; goto end; }
i++; }
end : · · · ;
Further techniques for control-ﬂow ﬂattening may include goto, throw/catch, and
other language depended instructions.
• Aliasing: An Alias represents an alternative path to manipulate the value, respec-
tively the memory location, of a variable. It forces adversaries to analyze how vari-
ables might be modiﬁed in several different ways. Missing one of these paths might
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result into an unexpected behavior for the adversary.
• Inserting bogus control ﬂows: A bogus control ﬂow interrupts the sequence of a code
segment by introducing additional branches to the code. Combined with opaque
predicates, these branches can simply split the sequence and after evaluating the
result resume the sequence or they can introduce additional execution paths.
• Jump through branch functions: Replacing unconditional jumps such as goto state-
ments, which jump to an address in the code given by a label, with branch functions.
The return address of the branch function stored in the ebp register is replaced with
the start address to the desired functionality. The function branch below shows an
example where the return address of the function in the ebp register is replaced by
the value in the parameter addr.
void branch(unsigned int addr){
__asm{mov ebp, addr; }
}
2.3.2 Opaque Predicates
We already introduced the basic idea of opaque predicates as a tool to complicate the con-
trol ﬂow. For the sake of completeness, in what follows we provide a description of some
specialized opaque predicates.
• Opaque predicates from pointer aliasing: Deﬁne a set of pointer structures G =
{G1, G2, · · · } where the elements in G are called graphs that contain a set of nodes
and further deﬁne a set of of pointers PTR = {ptr1, ptr2, · · · } pointing to some
nodes in the graphs. Modify in multiple iterations the graph structures by randomly
splitting the graphs, inserting, deleting, or moving nodes and reassigning the assigned
pointers to new nodes in the same graph. Based on the new structures deﬁne opaque
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predicates related the the resulting graphs (e.g., (ptr1 = ptr2) == true) and at
runtime, randomly reassign the pointers in the graphs to different nodes.
• Opaque values from array aliasing: Deﬁne an array (A[]) and ﬁll the array with values
following a speciﬁc scheme. Evaluate opaque predicates based on different entries in
the array. At runtime randomly modify the values in the array without violating the
deﬁned scheme. An example for this technique is:
if((A[6] mod A[2]) == A[1]) { · · · }
As seen in the example above, the scheme to assign and change values in the array
depends on the chosen relations for the opaque predicates.
• Opaque predicates from concurrency: Opaque predicates from concurrency work
with concurrent threads utilizing race conditions and maintaining the same data struc-
ture. Deﬁne the opaque predicates according to the expected values in the modiﬁed
data structure as a function of the thread winning the race.
2.3.3 Data Encodings
We can compare data encodings with encryption and decryption techniques from crypto-
graphy. An encoding function Enc() transforms the variable into an obfuscated representa-
tion and a decoding function Dec() undo this transformation. The transformed value must
be able to represent all the possible values that the entity can take which requires additional
functionality to guarantee this required behavior.
• Encoding integers: We can deﬁne a set of obfuscated operations in form of functions
(ENC(), DEC(), ADD(), SUB(), MULT(), LT(), · · · ) that neutralize each others ef-
fect. Several approaches for transforming an integer exist. These approaches range
from number-theoretic tricks to applying cryptographic algorithms such as the AES
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or DES to the target integer value. The following example, extracted from [21],
illustrate the above idea.
typedef int T;
T ENC (int e) {return e+ 1;}
int DEC(T d) {return d− 1;}
T ADD(T a, T b) {return a+ b− 1;}
T MULT(T a, T b) {return a ∗ b− a− b+ 2;}
BOOL LT(T a, T b) {return a < b;}
Another approach to encode integers is splitting the value in question. At this point
we only mention two of the many possible approaches. First, split the bit stream
representing the integer value into two pieces and assign the two values to different
variables. For the second approach, generate a random value, assign it to one variable
and assign the original value Xored with the random value to a second variable.
• Encoding Booleans: Similar to encoding integers, a set of functions representing
the required and transformed boolean operations can be deﬁned. These approaches
include splitting of the Boolean value, deﬁning our own true table, e.g., an even
integer value represents False and an odd value represents True.
• Encoding literal data: Literal data can be regarded as a specialized set of integer val-
ues and all transformations related to encoding integers can also be applied to literal
data. Due to the enhanced nature of literals, further approaches such as specialized
state machines further extend the applicable techniques.
• Encoding arrays: In contrast to the encoding approaches above, the obfuscation tech-
niques for arrays are somewhat limited and fall into two categories. First, the arrays
19
can be reordered by applying a permutation or a homomorphic function to the in-
dices of the array. The second category modiﬁes the structure of arrays. An array
can be split into several sub-arrays, different arrays can be merged together, a multi-
dimensional array can be ﬂattened into a lower dimension, and an array can be folded
into a new array of higher dimension.
It is not hard to imagine how different techniques can be combined together. For ex-
ample, after encoding an integer array, the values stored in the array can be subjected to
additional obfuscation techniques.
2.3.4 Breaking Abstractions
To provide a readable and maintainable code, programming tasks are broken down into sev-
eral parts that are implemented separately. Based on the resulting abstraction and program-
ming environment these parts can be represented by packages, modules, classes, functions,
structures, loops, frameworks/libraries, which may reveal information to the adversaries.
Breaking abstractions eliminates such structures. Additional abstractions to be considered
are given by the hardware and the operating system of the targeted computer system.
• Merging function signatures: This technique uniﬁes the function signatures in order
to prevent analysis based on function semantics. For example,
void foo(int x, float y){· · · ; }
int bar(char x){· · · ; }
void flu(float x, float y){· · · ; }
can be transformed into the following three functions with a uniform signature
int foo(int x, float y, f loat z, char a){· · · ; }
int bar(int x, float y, f loat z, char a){· · · ; }
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int flu(int x, float y, f loat z, char a){· · · ; }
• Modifying instruction encodings: This technique introduces its own interpreter as an
additional layer between the executing machine and the programm to be executed. It
also deﬁnes how the machine instructions are selected and interpreted. This approach
is based on a decoding binary tree to select the required instructions. At run time,
the structure of the tree is modiﬁed such that the same instruction uses different bit
patterns as a selection criterion. Due to the dynamic structure of the decoding tree,
this approach can only be applied on hard coded functionality which is called as a bit
structure representing a machine code from the program itself.
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Chapter 3
Application of Two Off-the-shelf
Algebraic Tools for Extraction of
Cryptographic Keys from Corrupted
Memory Images
Cryptographic key recovery from memory or memory dumps, for malicious or forensic pur-
poses, has attracted great attention of security professionals and cryptographic researchers.
In [48], Shamir and van Someren considered the problem of locating cryptographic keys
hidden in large amount of data, such as the complete ﬁle system of a computer system. In
addition to efﬁcient algebraic attacks locating secret RSA keys in long bit strings, they also
presented more general statistical attacks which can be used to ﬁnd arbitrary cryptographic
keys embedded in large ﬁles. This statistical approach relies on the simple fact that good
cryptographic keys possess high entropy. Areas with unusually high entropy can be located
by searching for unique byte patterns in sliding windows and then selecting those windows
with the highest numbers of unique bytes as a potential places for the key. Moe et al. [42]
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developed a proof of concept tool, Interrogate, which implements several search methods
for a set of key schedules. To verify the effectiveness of the developed tool, they investi-
gated key recovery for systems running in different states (live, screen-saver, dismounted,
hibernation, terminated, logged out, reboot, and boot states). Another proof of concept tool,
Disk Decryptor, which can extract Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and Whole Disk Encryption
(WDE) keys from dumps of volatile memories was presented in [38].
All the above techniques and tools took another dimension after the publication of the
cold boot attack by Halderman et al. [33]. While the remanence effect of RAM has already
been known since decades [49], it attracted greater attention in cryptography only after
Halderman et al. work in 2008, which explicitly exploited those observations to recover
cryptographic keys from the memory . They developed tools which capture everything
present in RAM before power was cut off and developed proof of concept tools which can
analyze these memory copies to extract secret DES, AES and RSA keys. In particular,
Heninger et al. [34] showed that an RSA private key with small public exponent can be
efﬁciently recovered given a 27% fraction of its bits at random. They have also developed a
recovery algorithm for the 128-bit version of AES (AES-128) that recovers keys from 30%
decayed AES-128 Key Schedule images in less than 20 minutes for half of the simulated
cases. Tsow [51] further improved upon the proof of concept in Halderman et al. and
presented a heuristic algorithm that solved all cases at 50% decay in under half a second.
At 60% decay, Tsow recovered the worst case in 35.5 seconds while solving the average
case in 0.174 seconds. At the extended decay rate of 70%, recovery time averages grew
to over 6 minutes with the median time at about ﬁve seconds. In [12], Albrecht et al.
proposed methods for key recovery of ciphers (AES, Serpent and Twoﬁsh) used in Full
Disk Encryption (FDE) products where they applied a method for solving a set of non-
linear algebraic equations with noise based on mixed integer programming. To improve
the running time of their algorithms, they only considered a reduced number of rounds.
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Applying their algorithms, they obtained satisfactory success rates for key recovery using
the Serpent key schedule up to 30% decay and for the AES up to 40% decay.
Cryptanalytic attacks can be classiﬁed into pure mathematical attacks and side chan-
nel attacks. Pure mathematical attacks, are traditional cryptanalytic techniques that rely
only on known or chosen input-output pairs of the cryptographic function, and exploit the
inner structure of the cipher to reveal secret key information. On the other hand, in side
channel attacks, it is assumed that the attacker has some physical access to the crypto-
graphic device through one or more side channel. Well-known side channels, which can
leak critical information about the encryption state, include timing information [39] and
power consumption [40].
In addition to these commonly exploited side channels, the remanence effect of random
access memory (RAM) is a highly critical side channel that has been recently exploited by
cold boot attacks [33] [34] to retrieve secret keys from RAM. Although dynamic RAMs
(DRAMs) become less reliable when its contents are not refreshed, they are not imme-
diately erased. In fact, contrary to popular belief, DRAMs may retain their contents for
seconds to minutes after power is lost and even if they are removed from the computer
motherboard. A cold boot attack is launched by removing the memory module, after cool-
ing it, from the target system and immediately plugging it in another system under the
adversary’s control. This system is then booted to access the memory. Another possible
approach to execute the attack is to cold boot the target machine by cycling its power off
and then on without letting it shut down properly. Upon reboot, a lightweight operating
system is instantly booted where the targeted memory contents are dumped to a ﬁle.
Experimental results in [49] show how data are retained for a relatively long time in
computer memories after a system power off. However, the ﬁrst work explicitly exploiting
those observations to recover cryptographic keys from the memory was reported by Hal-
derman et al. [33] where they presented proof of concept experiments which showed that
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it is practically feasible to perform cold boot attacks exploiting the remanence effect of
RAMs to recover secret keys of DES, AES and RSA. After the publication of Halderman
et al. [33], several other authors (e.g., [51] [12] [34]) further improved upon this proof of
concept and presented algorithms that solved cases with higher decay factors. However, al-
most all these previously proposed techniques were cipher-dependent and certainly uneasy
to develop and ﬁne tune. On the other hand, for symmetric ciphers, the relations that have
to be satisﬁed between the subround key bits in the key schedule always correspond to a set
of nonlinear Boolean equations. In this chapter, we investigate the use of an off-the-shelf
SAT solver (CryptoMiniSat [4]), and an open source Gröbner basis tool (PolyBoRi [16])
to solve the resulting system of equations. We also discuss the pros and cons of both tools
and present some experimental results for the extraction of AES and Serpent keys from
decayed memory images.
3.1 Modern Algebraic Tools and Their Applications to Crypto-
graphy
The use of SAT solvers and Gröbner basis in cryptanalysis has recently attracted the at-
tention of cryptanalysts. Courtois et al. [26] demonstrated a weakness in KeeLog by pre-
senting an attack which requires about 232 known plaintexts. For 30% of all keys, the full
key can be recovered against a complexity of 228 KeeLoq encryptions. In [25], 6 rounds
of DES are attacked with only a single known plaintext/ciphertext pair using a SAT solver.
Erickson et al. [32] used the SAT solver and Gröbner basis [17] attacks against SMS4 on
equation system over GF(2) and GF(28). In [18], a practical Gröbner basis [17] attack using
Magma was applied against the ciphers Flurry and Curry, recovering the full cipher key by
requiring only a minimal number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
SAT solvers and Gröbner basis have also been applied to the cryptanalysis of stream
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ciphers. Eibach et al. [31] presented experimental results on attacking a reduced version of
Trivium (Bivium) using exhaustive search, a SAT solver, a binary decision diagram (BDD)
based attack, a graph theoretic approach, and Gröbner basis. Their result implies that the
usage of the SAT solver is faster than the other attacks. The full key of Hitag2 stream
cipher is recovered in a few hours using MiniSat 2.0 [27]. In [28], the full 48-bit key of the
MiFareCrypto 1 algorithm was recovered in 200 seconds on a PC, given 1 known initial
vector (IV) from one single encryption. In [52], Velichkov et al. applied the Gröbner basis
on a reduced 16 bit version of the stream cipher Lex.
Mironov and Zhang [44] described some initial results on using SAT solvers to auto-
mate certain components in cryptanalysis of hash functions of the MD and SHA families.
De et al. [30] presented heuristics for solving inversion problems for functions that satisfy
certain statistical properties similar to that of random functions. They demonstrate that this
technique can be used to solve the hard case of inverting a popular secure hash function
and were able to invert MD4 up to 2 rounds and 7 steps in less than 8 hours. In [50], Sugita
et al. used the Gröbner basis to improve the attack on the 58-round SHA-1 hash function
to 231 computations instead of 234 in Wang’s method [54].
3.1.1 Gröbner Basis and PolyBoRi
A Gröbner basis is a set of multivariate polynomials that have desirable algorithmic proper-
ties. In what follows, we brieﬂy review some basic deﬁnitions and algebraic preliminaries
related to Gröbner basis as presented in [47].
Let K be any ﬁeld (in here we are interested in the case where K = F2.) We write
K[x1, ..., xn] for the ring of polynomials in n for the variables xi having its coefﬁcients in
the ﬁeld K.
Deﬁnition 3 A subset I ⊂ K[x1, ..., xn] is an ideal if it satisﬁes:
1. 0 ∈ I .
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2. if f ,g ∈ I , then f + g ∈ I .
3. if f ∈ I and h ∈ K[x1, ..., xn], then hf ∈ I .
Deﬁnition 4 Let f1, ..., fm be polynomials in K[x1, ..., xn]. Deﬁne the ideal 〈f1, ..., fm〉 =
{∑mi=1 hifi : h1, ..., hm ∈ K[x1, ..., xn] }. If there exists a ﬁnite set of polynomials in
K[x1, ..., xn] that generate the given ideal, we call this set a basis.
Deﬁnition 5 A monomial ordering on K[x1, ..., xn] is any relation > on Zn≥0, or equiva-
lently, any relation on the set of monomials xα, α ∈ Zn≥0, satisfying:
1. > is a total ordering on Zn≥0.
2. if α > β and α, β, γ ∈ Zn≥0, then α + γ > β + γ.
3. > is a well ordering on Zn≥0. That is every nonempty subset of Z
n
≥0 has a smallest
element with respect to >.
An example of monomial ordering for our application is lexicographic order which is
deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 6 (Lexicographic Order (lex)). Let α = (α1, ..., αn), and β = (β1, ..., βn) ∈
Z
n
≥0. We say α >lex β if, in the vector difference α− β ∈ Zn, the left-most nonzero entry is
positive. We will write xα >lex xβ if α >lex β.
Deﬁnition 7 Let f = Σαaαxα be a non-zero polynomial in P and let > be a monomial
order. The multidegree of f is multideg(f) = max>(α ∈ Zn0 : aα = 0).
Deﬁnition 8 (leading term of a polynomial). Let f(x) =
∑m
i=1 cαx
α : cα ∈ K is non-zero
and > is the order relation deﬁned for the monomials of the polynomial f(x). The greatest
monomial in f(x), regarding to the order relation>, is called the leading monomial for the
polynomial f(x) and is represented by LM(f) = xmultideg(f). Also the set M(f) consists
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of all monomials of f(x) and T (f) denote the set of all terms of f(x). The coefﬁcient of
the leading monomial is represented by LC(f) = amultideg(f) ∈ K and called the leading
coefﬁcient. The term containing both the leading coefﬁcient and leading monomial is called
the leading term, represented by LT (f) = LC(f) · LM(f).
The idea of Gröbner basis was ﬁrst proposed by Buchberger [17] to study the member-
ship of a polynomial in the ideal of the polynomial ring.
Deﬁnition 9 (Gröbner basis) Let an ideal I be generated by G = g1, ..., gm, where gi,
1 ≤ i ≤ m is a polynomial. G is called the Gröbner basis for the ideal I , if:
〈LT (I)〉 = 〈LT (g1), ..., LT (gm)〉,
where 〈LT (I)〉 denotes the ideal generated by the leading terms of the members in I .
One can view Gröbner basis as a multivariate, non-linear generalization of the Eu-
clidean algorithm for computation of univariate greatest common divisors, Gaussian elimi-
nation for linear systems, and integer programming problems. In this work, we use Gröbner
basis as an algebraic tool that allows us to solve non-linear Boolean equations by using the
PolyBoRi framework.
The following example explains the main involved steps and commands for the Poly-
BoRi framework in Sage [2] to solve a given system of nonlinear Boolean equations.
Example 3.1.1 Consider the following system of non-linear Boolean equations
x1x2 ⊕ x3x4 = 1,
x1x3x5 ⊕ x4x5 = 0,
x1x2x5 ⊕ x3x5 = 0,
x2x3 ⊕ x3x4x5 = 1,
(1)
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Figure 2 shows the steps to be executed in PolyBoRi to obtain the Gröbner basis of
the systems of equations in (1). As shown in the ﬁgure, the function ideal() in step 2 takes
the corresponding homogeneous system of equations as a calling parameter. The resulting
Gröbner basis is given by [x1 + x4 + 1, x2 + 1, x3 + 1, x24 + x4, x5]. In this notation, xi
appearing in a separate term by itself implies that the system of equations under considera-
tion can be solved by setting xi = 0. Similarly, xi+1 implies that xi = 1. Also, the notation
xi + x
2
i implies that xi can be assigned a 0 or a 1. Thus the above basis corresponds to
the following two independent solutions: {x1 = 1, x2 = 1, x3 = 1, x4 = 0, x5 = 0} and
















Figure 2: Working with PolyBoRi to solve the systems of equations in (1)
3.1.2 The SAT problem and CryptoMiniSat
The Boolean satisﬁability (SAT) problem [24] is deﬁned as follows: Given a Boolean for-
mula, check whether an assignment of Boolean values to the propositional variables in the
formula exists such that the formula evaluates to true. If such an assignment exists, the for-
mula is said to be satisﬁable; otherwise, it is unsatisﬁable. For a formula with m variables,
there are 2m possible truth assignments. The conjunctive normal form (CNF) is frequently
used for representing Boolean formulas. In CNF, the variables of the formula appear in lit-
erals (e.g., x) or their negation (e.g., x). Literals are grouped into clauses, which represent
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a disjunction (logical OR) of the literals they contain. A single literal can appear in any
number of clauses. The conjunction (logical AND) of all clauses represents a formula. For
example, the CNF formula (x1)∧ (x2 ∨ x3)∧ (x1 ∨ x3) contains three clauses: x1, x2 ∨ x3
and x1∨x3. Two literals in these clauses are positive (x1, x3) and two are negative (x2, x3).
For a variable assignment to satisfy a CNF formula, it must satisfy each of its clauses. For
example, if x1 is true and x2 is false, then all three clauses are satisﬁed, regardless of the
value of x3.
While the SAT problem has been shown to be NP-complete [24], efﬁcient heuristics
exist that can solve many real-life SAT formulations. Furthermore, the wide range of target
applications of SAT have motivated advances in SAT solving techniques that have been
incorporated into freely-available SAT solvers such as the CryptoMiniSat.
When preparing the input to the SAT solver, the terms of quadratic and higher degree
are handled by noting that the logical expression
(x1 ∨ T )(x2 ∨ T )(x3 ∨ T )(x4 ∨ T )(T ∨ x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3 ∨ x4) (2)
is tautologically equivalent to T ⇔ (x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4), or the GF (2) equation T =
x1x2x3x4. Similar expressions exist for higher order terms. Thus, the system of equations
obtained in this step can be linearized by introducing new variables as illustrated by the
following example.
Example 3.1.2 Suppose we would like to ﬁnd the Boolean variable assignment that satis-
ﬁes the following formula
x0 ⊕ x1x2 ⊕ x0x1x2 = 0.
Then, using the approach illustrated in (2), we introduce two linearization variables,
T0 = x1x2 and T1 = x0x1x2. Thus we have
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x0 ⊕ T0 ⊕ T1 = 0,
(T 0 ∨ x1) ∧ (T 0 ∨ x2) ∧ (T0 ∨ x1 ∨ x2) = 1,
(T 1 ∨ x0) ∧ (T 1 ∨ x1) ∧ (T 1 ∨ x2)∧
(T1 ∨ x0 ∨ x1 ∨ x2) = 1.
(3)
Since the CryptoMiniSat expects only positive clauses and the CNF form does not have
any constants, we need to overcome the problem that the ﬁrst line in (3) corresponds to
a negative, i.e., false, clause. Adding the clause consisting of a dummy variable, d, or
equivalently (d∧d · · ·∧d) would require the variable d to be true in any satisfying solution,
since all clauses must be true in any satisfying solution. In other words, the variable d will
serve the place of the constant 1.
Therefore, the above formula can be expressed as
d = 1,
x0 ⊕ T0 ⊕ T1 ⊕ d = 1,
(T 0 ∨ x1) ∧ (T 0 ∨ x2) ∧ (T0 ∨ x1 ∨ x2) = 1,
(T 1 ∨ x0) ∧ (T 1 ∨ x1) ∧ (T 1 ∨ x2)∧
(T1 ∨ x0 ∨ x1 ∨ x2) = 1.
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Applying the same logic to the system of equations in (1), we obtain
d = 1,
T1 ⊕ T2 = 1,
(T1 ∨ x1) ∧ (T1 ∨ x2) ∧ (T1 ∨ x1 ∨ x2) = 1,
(T2 ∨ x3) ∧ (T2 ∨ x4) ∧ (T2 ∨ x3 ∨ x4) = 1,
T3 ⊕ T4 ⊕ d = 1,
(T3 ∨ x1) ∧ (T3 ∨ x3) ∧ (T3 ∨ x5)∧
(T3 ∨ x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x5) = 1,
(T4 ∨ x4) ∧ (T4 ∨ x5) ∧ (T4 ∨ x4 ∨ x5) = 1,
T5 ⊕ T6 ⊕ d = 1,
(T5 ∨ x1) ∧ (T5 ∨ x2) ∧ (T5 ∨ x5)∧
(T3 ∨ x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x5) = 1,
(T6 ∨ x3) ∧ (T6 ∨ x5) ∧ (T6 ∨ x3 ∨ x5) = 1,
T7 ⊕ T8 = 1,
(T7 ∨ x2) ∧ (T7 ∨ x3) ∧ (T7 ∨ x2 ∨ x3) = 1,
(T8 ∨ x3) ∧ (T8 ∨ x4) ∧ (T8 ∨ x5)∧
(T8 ∨ x3 ∨ x4 ∨ x5) = 1,
Figure 3 shows the CryptoMiniSat input ﬁle corresponding to the above system of equa-
tions. As shown in the ﬁgure, a negative number implies that the variables assumes a value
= 0 and a positive number implies a value = 1. Lines starting with ‘x’ denote an XOR
equation and each lines is terminated with ‘0’.
From the above examples, its is clear that, compared to PolyBoRi, preparing the input
for the CryptoMiniSat requires relatively longer pre-processing steps. Also, unlike the
Gröbner basis approach which returns the general form of the solution, CryptoMiniSat













































Figure 3: CryptoMiniSat input ﬁle corresponding to the system of equations in (1)
be negated and added to the SAT solver input ﬁle. In the example above, the ﬁrst solution
returned by the CryptoMiniSat ({1, −2, 3, 4, 5, −6, −7, 8, −9, −10, −11, −12, 13, −14})
is negated ({−1, 2, −3, −4, −5, 6, 7, −8, 9, 10, 11, 12, −13, 14}) and added to the SAT
solver input ﬁle as a new entry. When running the SAT solver again, this added entry forces
the SAT solver to eliminate this as a possible solution and search for a new one that solves
the SAT problem. When doing so, the SAT solver returns the second possible solution ({1,
2, 3, 4, −5, −6, 7, −8, −9, −10, −11, −12, 13, −14}).
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3.2 Structure of the AES-128 and Serpent Key Schedules
In this section, we brieﬂy review the relevant details of the AES-128 and Serpent key
schedules.
3.2.1 Key Schedule of AES-128
In the following we describe the AES-128 key scheduler [29] [1]. AES-128 works with a
user key (Master Key) of 128 bits (16 bytes) represented by a 4x4 array K0i,j , the AES state
matrix; with 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 3 where i and j denote the row and column indices, respectively.
Kr+1i,j denotes the bijective mapping of the user key to the 10 sub-round keys, where 0 ≤
r ≤ 9 denotes the number of the rounds. The rth key schedule round is deﬁned by the
following transformations:
Kr+10,0 ← S(Kr1,3)⊕Kr0,0 ⊕Rcon(r + 1)
Kr+1i,0 ← S(Kr(i+1)mod4,3)⊕Kri,0, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3
Kr+1i,j ← Kr+1i,j−1 ⊕Kri,j, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3
(4)
where Rcon(·) denotes a round-dependent constant and S(·) represents the s-box opera-
tions based on the 8× 8 Rijndael S-box [29]. Figure 4 shows the transformations given by
equation 4.
3.2.2 Key Schedule of Serpent
Serpent [13] is a 32 round block cipher based on a substitution permutation network (SPN)
structure with an Initial Permutation (IP) and a Final Permutation (FP). It has 32 rounds,
each consists of a key mixing operation, a pass through S-boxes, and (in all but the last
round) a linear transformation. In the last round, this linear transformation is replaced by
an additional key mixing operation. The cipher accepts a variable user key length that is
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always padded up to 256 bits by appending one bit-value ‘1’ to the end of the most signif-
icant bit followed by bit-values ‘0’. To obtain the 33 128-bit subkeys K0, ..., K32, the user
key is divided into eight 32-bit words w−8, w−7, ..., w−1, from which the 132 intermediate
keys or pre-keys (w0...w131) are derived as follows:
wi := (wi−8 ⊕ wi−5 ⊕ wi−3 ⊕ wi−1 ⊕ φ⊕ i) <<< 11 (5)
where φ is a constant formed by the fractional part of the golden ratio (
√
5 + 1)/2 or
0x9e3779b9 in hexadecimal.
The round keys ki are evaluated from the pre-keys by ﬁrst calling one of the eight 4× 4
S-boxes in bit slice mode. In bit slice mode, each input of the S-box comes from a different
32-bit word and each output goes to a different 32-bit word. The 4x32 bits per round are
all handled by the same S-box. A group of four input or four output words deﬁnes a unit
that is handled together. The transformation from pre-keys wi into words kj of round keys
is performed as follows:
{k0; k1; k2; k3} = S3(w0;w1;w2;w3)
{k4; k5; k6; k7} = S2(w4;w5;w6;w7)
{k8; k9; k10; k11} = S1(w8;w9;w10;w11)
{k12; k13; k14; k15} = S0(w12;w13;w14;w15)




{k124; k125; k126; k127} = S4(w124;w125;w126;w127)
{k128; k129; k130; k131} = S3(w128;w129;w130;w131)
(6)
where Si denotes the ith S-box of Serpent. The round keys Ki are then formed by
regrouping the 32-bit values kj as 128-bit sub-keys Ki (for i ∈ 0,.., r) as follows:
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Ki := {k4i; k4i+1; k4i+2; k4i+3} (7)
Finally, we apply IP to the round keys Ki in order to place the key bits in the correct
column, i.e., Kˆi = IP(Ki). Figure 5 depicts the described key scheduler of Serpent.
By exploiting the asymmetric decay of the memory images and the redundancy of key
material inherent in the key schedule of both algorithms above, rectifying the faults in the
corrupted memory images of the the key schedule is formulated as a Boolean satisﬁability
problem which can be solved efﬁciently for relatively large decay factors.
3.3 Simulation Results
Because of the nature of the cold boot attack, it is realistic to assume that only a corrupted
image of the contents of memory is available to the attacker, i.e., a fraction of the memory
bits will be ﬂipped from its charged state. Halderman et al. [33] observed that, within
a speciﬁc memory region, the decay is overwhelmingly asymmetric, i.e., either 0 → 1 or
1 → 0. When trying to retrieve cryptographic keys, the decay direction for a region can
be determined by comparing the number of 0’s and 1’s since in an uncorrupted key, the
expected number of 0’s and 1’s should approximately be equal.
Similar to the previous work in [33] [51], throughout our experimental results, we as-
sume an asymmetric decay model where bits overwhelmingly decay to their ground state
rather than their charged state. Using this model, only the bits that remain in their charged
state are useful to the cryptanalyst since one cannot be sure about the original values of
the 0 bits, i.e., whether they were originally 0’s or decayed 1’s. Let β denote the fraction
of decayed bits. If the percentage of 0’s and 1’s in the original key schedule bits is pz and
1 − pz, respectively, then the fraction, f , of key bits that can be assumed to be known by
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examining the decayed memory of the key schedule is given by
f = 1− (pz + β × (1− pz)) = (1− pz)× (1− β).
Since in an uncorrupted key schedule key, we expect the number of 0’s and 1’s to be ap-
proximately equal, i.e., pz ≈ 1/2, then we have f ≈ (1− β)/2.
In our experiments, the input ﬁles for the CryptoMiniSat contained 5,144 and 18,500
clauses for AES and Serpent, respectively. For PolyBoRi, 1,280 equations with 1,728
variables were deﬁned for AES and 8,448 equations with 8,704 variables were deﬁned for
Serpent.
Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 show statistics for the run time required to recover the key of AES
and Serpent from the corresponding corrupted memory images for different decay factors.
These runtime statistics were obtained using PolyBoRi and CryptoMiniSat running on a
Dell Precision 370 workstation with a 3.0 GHz Intel Pentium 4 CPU and 1 GB of RAM.
Examining the results in the tables reveal the following observations:
• While the resource requirements of both tools (time for CryptoMiniSat, and time and
memory for PolyBori) seem to grow exponentially with the decay factor, for practical
values of the decay factor, both tools require reasonably short time to recover the
secret keys from corrupted memory images.
• The simple and high redundancy in the AES key schedule allows for faster recovery
of the key from corrupted memory images. This makes AES more prone to these
attacks as compared to other AES ﬁnalist such as Serpent. In fact, our initial experi-
ments with Twoﬁsh [10] indicate that its relatively more complex key schedule limits
the practical applications of these tools to very small values of the decay factor.
• CryptoMiniSat seems to be more suitable for applications in this type of attacks. In
particular, every time we tried to push the decay factor higher than the values reported
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in Table 4, the PolyBoRi tool always crashed after few minutes due to the excessive
memory consumption. This behavior also persisted on a 64 bit Linux operating sys-
tems with a freshly compiled PolyBoRi/sage system and 8 GB RAM. The question
remains if solutions for a higher decay factor can be achieved in a reasonable time if
this memory limitations is ﬁxed in the tool.
Table 3: Run-time statistics using Gröbner basis for AES.
Decay 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Min 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.3 2.2 3.5 7
Max 0.7 0.9 1.1 2.1 3.6 7.6 45
Avg. 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.7 2.9 5.6 21
St.Dev 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.2 13
Med. 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.7 2.9 5.3 15
Table 4: Run-time statistics using Gröbner basis for Serpent.
Decay 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Min 8 9 17 56 114 417 -
Max 9 34 50 2075 2812 578 -
Avg. 8 15 36 328 399 507 -
St.Dev 0.3 7 11 656 764 47 -
Med. 8 12 40 107 131 504 -
Table 5: Run-time statistics using SAT-solver for AES [37].
Decay 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Min 0.046 0.046 0.062 0.062 0.078
Max 0.593 0.140 0.187 0.593 207.171
Avg. 0.064 0.066 0.074 0.102 1.233
St.Dev 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.028 4.899
Med. 0.062 0.062 0.078 0.093 0.359
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Table 6: Run-time statistics using SAT-solver for Serpent.
Decay 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Min 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 4
Max 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.6 8.0 69 35282
Avg. 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.9 8 1278
St.Dev 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.22 1.30 11 4402
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Figure 4: Key Schedule of AES
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Figure 5: Key Schedule of Serpent
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Chapter 4
An Obfuscated Implementation of RC4
Cryptographic techniques are traditionally implemented to protect data and keys against at-
tacks where the adversary may observe various inputs to and outputs from the system, but
has no access to the internal details of the execution. On the other hand, several recently
developed applications require a higher degree of robustness against attacks from the exe-
cution environment where the adversary has closer access to the software implementation
of key instantiated primitives. Digital Rights Management (DRM) is an example of such
applications where one of the main design objective is to control access to digital media
content. This higher degree of robustness can be achieved through white-box implemen-
tations where encryption keys are hidden, using obfuscation techniques, within the imple-
mentation of the cipher. White-box implementations for block ciphers, such as AES and
DES, are widely available [20] [19].
On the other hand, obfuscation can be used to transform a program from an easily
readable format to one that is harder to read, trace, understand and modify. This offers an
additional layer of security as it protects the program by increasing the required human and
computational power that is needed to reverse engineer, alter, or compromise the obfuscated
program. Obfuscation techniques can be categorized into automated and manual methods.
The former systematically, using speciﬁc tools, modify the source code (e.g. [3]) or the
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binary executable ﬁle (e.g. [11] [6]). The latter techniques rely on the programmer to follow
obfuscation techniques during coding. These techniques are governed by the programming
language in use. For example, languages like C and C++, which are commonly used in
the implementation of cryptographic primitives due their high performance, are ﬂexible in
syntax and allow the use of pointers.
Obfuscated programs can be reverse engineered using techniques such as static and dy-
namic analysis. Static analysis techniques analyze the program ﬁle by performing control
ﬂow and data ﬂow analysis ( [21] [53]) without running the program. Dynamic analysis,
on the other hand, takes place at runtime and addresses the followed execution path.
In this chapter, we investigate several obfuscation techniques that are suitable for appli-
cations to array-based stream ciphers such as RC4. We also perform a comparison between
the performance of these different techniques when applied to RC4. Although our pro-
posed implementation does not provide the same level of theoretical security provided by
white-box implementations for block ciphers, it still provides a high degree of robustness
against attacks from execution environments where the adversary has access to the software
implementation such as in digital right management applications.
4.1 The RC4 Cipher
In this section, we brieﬂy review the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA), and the Pseudo-
random Generation Algorithm (PRGA) of RC4. We also describe the Skype attempt to
provide an obfuscated software implementation for RC4.
4.1.1 Standard RC4 Implementation
While traditional feedback shift register based stream ciphers are efﬁcient in hardware,
they are less so in software since they require several operations at the bit level. The design
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of RC4 avoids the use of bitwise operations as it requires only byte manipulations which
makes it very efﬁcient in software. In particular, RC4 uses 256 bytes of memory for the
state array, S[0] through S[255], k bytes of memory for the key, key[0] through key[k− 1],
and two index pointers: a sequential index i, and quasi random index j.
Algorithm 1 shows the KSA of RC4, where the permutation S is initialized with a key
of variable length, typically between 40 to 256 bits. Once this is completed, the key stream
is generated using the PRGA shown in Algorithm 2. The generated key stream is combined
with the plaintext, usually, through an XOR operation.
1: for i = 0 → 255 do
2: S[i] := i
3: end for
4:
5: j := 0
6: for i = 0 → 255 do
7: j := (j + S[i] + key[i mod keylength]) mod 256
8: swap values of S[i] and S[j]
9: end for
Algorithm 1: RC4 Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) [43]
1: i := 0
2: j := 0
3: while GeneratingOutput do
4: i := (i + 1) mod 256
5: j := (j + S[i]) mod 256
6: swap values of S[i] and S[j]
7: K := S[(S[i] + S[j]) mod 256]
8: output K
9: end while
Algorithm 2: RC4 Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm (PRGA) [43]
Analyzing the KSA and PRGA algorithms of RC4 yields the following observations:
1. As with most stream ciphers, an adversary does not have to ﬁnd the key in order to
break the cipher. In other words, recovering the initialized inner-state S allows the
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adversary to efﬁciently generate the keystream output of the cipher and decrypt the
target ciphertext even without knowing the key array.
2. An adversary who is able to observe the values of the index pointer j in the PRGA
can efﬁciently recover the whole inner state S.
4.1.2 Skype’s RC4 Implementation
The only reference to obfuscated RC4 implementation in the open literature appeared in a
Blackhat publication that describes the leaked implementation used in Skype [7] [14]. By
analyzing this leaked implementation, we observe the following:
• Regarding the cipher itself, the cryptographic key used is 80 bytes in length whereas
standard implementations use a key of 40 to 256 bits in length (i.e. 5 to 32 bytes).
• Regarding key management, the Skype’s implementation selects a key from a pool
of 232 keys.
• Regarding the use of the cipher, RC4 itself is used as an obfuscation technique to
hide the network layer.
The implementation utilizes a macro called RC4_round that is used in both the KSA
and the PRGA. Therefore, we ﬁrst describe this macro. This macro is shown in Algorithm
3. When called, the macro is passed the following parameters:
i: the sequential index
j: the quasi random index
RC4: an array corresponding to S in the standard implementation
t: a variable for swapping the ith and jth element in S
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k: the cryptographic key used in this iteration
Lines 1, 3 and 4 describe the swapping operation, line 2 evaluates the new quasi random
index j, and line 5 evaluates the key for this iteration. The main difference in the use of
this macro between KSA and PRGA is in the key value passed and the action based on the
return value. In the PRGA, the value for k is always zero, whereas in the KSA, the key
used in this iteration is passed. Furthermore, in the KSA, the returned value of this macro
is discarded, whereas in the PRGA the returned value is used as part of the key stream.
1: t :=RC4[i],
2: j := (j + t + k) mod 256,
3: RC4[i] := RC4[j],
4: RC4[j] := t,
5: RC4[(RC4[i] + t) mod 256] {Output to be returned}
Algorithm 3: Round Macro: RC4_round(i,j,t,k,RC4) [7]
The KSA is shown in Algorithm 4. In this implementation, the inner-state of the cipher
is stored in a data structure called rc4. This structure contains an array (representing the
array S from Algorithms 1 and 2) which holds the random ordered values, a sequential
index i, and quasi random index j. The ”for” loop in lines 1 through 6 initializes the
array rc4.s sequentially from 0 to 255. The array rc4.s is allocated exactly 256 sequential
bytes in memory. The implementation takes advantage of the array structure in memory by
initializing 4 bytes in each iteration rather than a single byte. Therefore, the index j in the
loop is incremented in each iteration by 4 bytes (0x04040404), and is assigned to the array
at the ith position. Consequently, the index i has to be incremented by 4 in each iteration.
The reordering step (lines 9 through 11) is done by the macro RC4_round.
The PRGA is shown in Algorithm 5 where the ”for” loop iterates over the data stream
(buffer, of size bytes) performing the encryption/decryption operation. This is done by
XORing the data (in buffer) and the key stream generated by the macro RC4_round. Fur-
thermore, the indices i and j in the data structure rc4 are updated.
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1: j := 0x03020100
2: for i = 0 → 255 do
3: i := i + 4
4: j := j + 0x04040404
5: rc4.s[i] := j
6: end for
7:
8: j := 0
9: for i = 0 → 255 do
10: RC4_round(i, j, t, byte(key,i%80), rc4.s)
11: end for
Algorithm 4: Skype Implementation for the RC4 KSA [7]
1: for (; bytes; bytes−−) do
2: i := (i + 1) mod 256
3: buffer++ {positioning the pointer to the new value to be en-/decrypted}
4: *buffer = *buffer XOR RC4_round(i, j, t, 0, s)
5: rc4.i := i
6: rc4.j := j
7: end for
Algorithm 5: Skype Implementation for the RC4 PRGA [7]
Clearly, the Skype implementation described above does not provide enough level of
protection for the inner state of the cipher. It should be noted, however, that Skype uses the
RC4 cipher itself as an obfuscation technique for the network layer but the effective data
stream (voice, chat, video) is encrypted with AES [14].
4.2 Proposed Implementation
In this section we present our obfuscated implementation of RC4. Throughout our work,
we assume that the cipher is implemented as a standalone module, i.e., the implemented
code contains only the functionality of the cipher. Another approach would be to mix
the implementation of the cipher with parts of a larger application. Such a needle in the
haystack approach can add more security as the containing application offers more obfus-
cation space. However, since an implementation of this approach is highly dependent on
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the containing application, it is therefore not considered in this work.
In our proposed obfuscated implementation, we ﬁrst eliminate the use of the array S
by using independent set of variables. To improve the efﬁciency of this approach, we use
function pointers. Following that, we utilize multithreading to provide security against
dynamic analysis attacks. Finally, we present other generic techniques used to further
obfuscate the proposed implementation. Throughout the remaining of this chapter, for
illustrative purposes, we use a toy implementation of RC4 (with an array of size N = 4).
However, performance measures have been made based on a RC4 with standard parameters
(i.e. with an array of size N = 256).
4.2.1 Eliminating the S Array Data Structure
As the KSA and PRGA algorithms show, standard RC4 implementation requires only a
few data objects, namely two index pointers i and j, and an array S.
As a ﬁrst step towards obfuscation, we substitute the array data structure S by N inde-
pendent variables, whereN is the number of elements in the array S. Unlike the elements of
an array which are stored in consecutive memory locations, these independent variables can
be scattered throughout the program memory. On the other hand, working with such inde-
pendent variables eliminates our ability to dynamically address them using a loop structure
since we no longer have an array index that can be related to loop counters. To address
these variables, we use the loop unrolling technique, also known as loop unwinding. This
is illustrated for the toy implementation in Figure 6. As depicted in the ﬁgure, the imple-
mentation is based on two nested switch/case structures, where the outer structure operates
over the index i and the inner structure operates over the index j. It is worth noting that the
inner switch/case structures are almost identical for various outer switch/case structures.
However, since the ith element in array S has been substituted with an independent vari-
able, this variable has to be correctly referenced in each inner switch/case structure. This
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nested structure cannot dynamically evaluate expressions such as S[S[i] + S[j]]. For such
expressions, a dedicated switch/case structure, Switch(Output − Index), is used. This
structure is passed an intermediate value, Output− Index = S[i]+S[j], and evaluates the
expression above. In an 8 bit implementation with an array of size N = 256, the number
of possible combinations is given by N × N = 28 × 28 = 216. This implies that a total
of 216 case statements are needed to represent all the possible combinations. Thus, despite
its conceptual simplicity, the use of nested switch/case structures results in a prohibitively
large program (e.g. for N = 256, the program size exceeds 12 MB). In the next subsection
we show how this obfuscation approach can be enhanced to yield a more practical program
size.
4.2.2 The Use of Function Pointers
Function pointers are pointers that hold addresses of functions, and can be used to execute
them. Depending on the address assigned to the pointer, a single function pointer can be
used to call multiple functions. Normally, a designated array is used to hold the addresses
of the functions and when a function is to be called, its address is assigned to the pointer
and the function is executed. A visualization of function pointers is shown in Figure 7
where the array fctArrJ [] is the designated array that holds the addresses of functions
jX(), jY (), jZ(). As the code fragment shows, the address of the desired function in
loaded into the function pointer fctP tr, and then executed. T. Ogiso et al. [45] analyze the
use of function pointers in software obfuscation. Speciﬁcally, they prove that when using
arrays of function pointers, determining the address a pointer points to is NP-hard.
Arrays of function pointers can be used to replace the inner switch/case structures in
our obfuscation technique presented in the previous subsection. In addition to the security
advantage resulting from the difﬁculty of determining the address a function pointer points
to, implementing function pointers requires much less space than switch/case structures
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described in the previous section. This enables us to maintain the complexity introduced
by the nested switch/case structure while reducing the program size.
The use of function pointers as a replacement of the inner switch/case statement re-
quires the following:
1. For each index j, there exists a function in which the variable that substitutes S[j] is
hard coded. Furthermore, the variable that substitutes S[i] is passed as a parameter to
this function. With these variables, the functionality of RC4 can be easily realized.
2. There exists a designated array that holds the addresses of the functions described
above.
The array of function pointers can be directly used to replace the inner switch/case
structures operating on index j. The inner switch/case statements are replaced by functions
in which the variable representing S[j] is hard coded. To evaluate the inner structure, we
ﬁrst compute the new j value. This is used to retrieve the corresponding function address
from the designated array. Finally, the retrieved function is called using a function pointer
and the variable that substitutes S[i] is passed as a parameter.
Figure 8 shows the use of function pointers as a replacement of the inner switch/case
structures of our obfuscated toy implementation of RC4. As shown in the ﬁgure, the loop
over index i remains unrolled using the switch/case structure proposed initially. The setup
for the array of function pointers requires:
1. The declaration of two function pointers (∗output and ∗jN )
2. The deﬁnition of output functions oS0(), oS1(), os2() and oS3() that return the value
S[x]
3. The deﬁnition of functions j0(sX), j1(sX), j2(sX) and j3(sX) that replace the
inner switch/case structure
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4. The deﬁnition of arrays used to hold the addresses of the functions stated in steps 2
and 3 above
Next, we illustrate the combination of switch/case structures with array function pointers.
The outer structure used to unroll the loop over the index i remains unchanged. However,
the inner switch/case structure is replaced by using the function pointers concept. To do
this, we ﬁrst compute the new j value. This is used to retrieve the corresponding function
address from the designated array. Finally, the retrieved function is called using a function
pointer where the variable that represents S[i] is passed as a parameter. With these vari-
ables, the functionality of RC4 can be realized. When implemented, this approach while
improving the obfuscation level, signiﬁcantly reduces the obfuscated program size. In com-
parison to the initial attempt (in section 4.2.1), the program size is reduced from 12 MB to
about 450 KB.
The techniques used so far have mainly increased the resilience of the implementa-
tion against static analysis. We, next, introduce further obfuscation with the objective of
increasing its resilience against dynamic analysis.
4.2.3 Multithreading
Traditionally, multithreading allows various parts of a program to run simultaneously.
Each such part is called a thread and although these are functionally independent, they
share some resources such as processing power and memory, with other threads. Shared
resources, such as data, code, and heap segments allow communication and functional
synchronization between threads. Furthermore, constructs such as critical sections, and
semaphores enable the realization of atomic units which, in turn, prevent corruption of
shared resources. Because of this parallelism and the randomness in order of execution, an-
alyzing multithreaded programs is much harder than their single threaded counterparts [22].
In this section, we capitalize on this and utilize the randomness in the order of execution
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introduced by multithreading to further obfuscate our implementation. To do so, we require
the following:
1. There exists a multithreaded environment where each thread implements the RC4
functionality (key stream value) for a speciﬁc subset of index values i. That is, each
thread contains an implementation of a subset of switch/case statement for the corre-
sponding values of i. Furthermore, for each implemented switch/case statement, let
the thread implement the function pointer concept for all values of j, as described in
4.2.2.
2. The sets of index values i are assigned to the threads such that each value of i is
assigned randomly to at least two threads. This introduces randomness in the threads
that have the capability of implementing the RC4 functionality for a given value
of i. Since at least two threads have this capability, the execution path cannot be
determined with certainty which introduces an additional layer of obfuscation.
If one uses only 2 threads, requirement 2 above would result in identical functionality
for both threads, which simpliﬁes conducting static analysis on the cipher. Thus, in our
implementation, the minimum number of threads used is set to 3. This ensures that the
implementations of various threads differ. The speciﬁc number of threads to be used is left
as a design parameter.
To compute the key stream value for the current value of i, the running thread enters a
critical section and retrieves i. If this thread does not implement the switch/case statement
for this value of i, the critical section exits without affecting the cipher inner state and
without producing any new keystream words. On the other hand, if the thread implements
the switch/case statement for this value of i, the key stream value is evaluated and returned.
Figure 9 illustrates a toy implementation, with N = 4, of the multithreading imple-
mentation described above. In this example, the sequential index i can have the values
52
{0, 1, 2, 3}, and 3 threads are used. The ﬁrst thread implements the switch/case statements
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}; the second thread implements the statements for i ∈ {0, 2, 3}, and the
third thread implements the statements for i ∈ {0, 1, 3}. For standard RC4 parameters, this
implementation increases the program size to 650 KB but offers an additional obfuscation
layer and enhances the implementation’s resilience to dynamic analysis attacks.
4.2.4 Handling the Key Scheduling Process
As shown in section 4.1.1, RC4 runs two main algorithms, the PRGA, and the KSA. While
the implementation of the KSA can be obfuscated using the same techniques discussed
above, one weakness of this approach is that the cryptographic key has to be passed in the
clear to the KSA algorithm. In this section, we discuss a possible extension of the above
implementation in order to mitigate this vulnerability.
In the white-box implementations of AES [20] and DES [19], the cryptographic key is
integrated into the lookup tables of the implemented algorithms. Furthermore, the lookup
tables are pre-created outside the users’ environment. Applying this off-line generation
technique to the inner states of RC4 can be used to eliminate the need for a KSA algorithm
and consequently mitigate the vulnerability described above. This shifts our objective from
protecting the key and key scheduling algorithm to protecting the process of securely as-
signing the off-line generated values to the inner-state.
Assume a setup where the user receives some encrypted data stream, and pre-created
inner-state for the cipher from some service provider. In this case, the inner-state can be
transferred from the provider to the customer in the form of an array. Instead of generating
the inner-state by the KSA, the inner-state is initialized by directly assigning the values
from the array to the corresponding variables. In other words, the array from the provider
contains 256 values corresponding to S and the two index pointers i and j in a random
order. Those 258 values are directly assigned to the variables representing the inner-state
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on the customer side. It should be noted that as long as the order of the values in the array
is not known, an adversary cannot gain any useful information about the inner state of the
cipher. Furthermore, assuming that the service provider knows the memory structure of
the user’s cipher, the service provider can produce a formatted memory dump that can be
loaded directly into the user’s cipher.
To this point, our obfuscation approaches structurally altered the implementation of the
cipher. Additional obfuscation techniques, that are deployable on a smaller scale can also
be utilized. These techniques do not signiﬁcantly change the implemented structure and are
easily applied. In the next subsection, we brieﬂy explore the application of such techniques
to our RC4 implementation.
4.2.5 Generic Obfuscation Techniques
In this section, we introduce a set of standard techniques that can be used to further ob-
fuscate our implementation of RC4. These techniques are independent of the structure
of the implemented program and do not signiﬁcantly change the structure of the resulting
obfuscated program.
Order and Dimension Change of Arrays
When using arrays of function pointers, assigning the pointers to the array in a sequential
order introduces a 1 : 1 mapping between the j value and the index of the array. This
mapping can be further obfuscated using a random allocation table or by modifying the
array structure. In [55], Zhu, et al. address this problem by changing the index order and
the arrays’ dimension. Transforming an array A[N ] into an array B[M ], whereM > N
and M is relatively prime to N , can be done by applying the mapping B[i] = A[i ×




When two or more variables address the same memory location, they are called aliases.
Introducing aliases to a program reduces the effectiveness of static analysis techniques as
they increase the data ﬂow complexity [21] since the attacker has to identify and track all
aliases that manipulate a speciﬁc memory location. The larger the program, the harder it
is for the attacker to identify and keep track of all the aliases. The pointers used in our
implementation are an extensive form of aliasing, and therefore, introduce an additional
level of obfuscation.
Scattering the Code for the Swap Operations
The RC4 cipher makes extensive use of swapping in both the KSA and the PRGA algo-
rithms. In a standard implementation, monitoring the swapping function easily reveals the
position of j and consequently, its value, which compromises the security of the imple-
mentation. To address this problem, in our implementation, we scatter the steps of the
swap functionality throughout the program. In addition, we use a pool of temporarily swap
variables rather than a single variable.
Opaque Constructs
Opaque predicates are expressions that evaluate either to true or false upon a given condi-
tion, but their outcome is known/controlled in advance. These constructs introduce con-
fusion and are widely used in obfuscation [21] [23]. Opaque predicates can be classiﬁed
based on their possible outcome into two types. In the ﬁrst type, the outcome is always
either ’true’ or always ’false’. An example of such predicate would be j > 255, which
is always evaluated ’false’ in an 8 bit environment. In the second type, the output could
be either ’true’ or ’false’, but is controlled by adjusting the statement that it evaluates. To
increase the complexity of control ﬂow analysis, we implemented a similar approach where
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either the real function or some other dummy one is executed.
Evaluation of the Index Pointer j
Normally, the index pointer j, at step i, is calculated as
ji = ji−1 + S[i] (8)
where ji denotes the value of the index pointer j at iteration i and S[i] denotes the value
of the inner state array during the ith iteration of the cipher. Monitoring the value of ji,
while knowing the value of i, allows reproducing the inner state. In our implementation,
we obfuscate the computation of ji by introducing three intermediate variables (a, b, c) that
are initialized as follows:
b = random,
a = b− ji−1,
c = 2a− b− S[i+ 1].
Then we calculate the value of ji as ji = a− c.
4.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section we compare the execution costs (i.e., program size and execution time) for
various combinations of obfuscation techniques proposed in the previous sections.
The reported timing, as summarized in Table 7, are measured on an HP PC with a
quad core Intel 2.67 GHz processor, and 8 GB of RAM. The prototype was implemented
in C using Microsoft Visual C++ that was running on Windows 7 Enterprise platform. As
expected, obfuscated implementations impose a penalty on the resulting program size and
execution speed.
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RC4 Implementation options Program Size (KB) Throughput (KB/sec) a b c d
No obfuscation 8 288,700 - - - -
Conﬁguration 1 514 17,850 x - - -
Conﬁguration 2 518 15,450 x x - -
Conﬁguration 3 537 11,500 x x x -
Fully obfuscated 969 600 x x x x
Table 7: Program size and throughout for different obfuscation options
a: Loop unrolling over index pointer i, Array of function pointers, Variable aliases,
Opaque constructs
b: Order and dimension change of arrays
c: Evaluation of index pointer j
d: Multithreading
From Table 7, the slowdown factor varies highly between the obfuscation conﬁgura-
tions. For conﬁguration 1, the slowdown factor is about 16, whereas the slowdown factor
when implementing all the described obfuscation techniques is about 481. The slowdown
factors for the white-box implementations of AES and DES found in the published litera-
ture are 55 for AES and 10 for DES [46] [41].
In the following subsections, we highlight the main causes of this performance impair-
ment.
4.3.1 Multithreading
Although multithreading is typically used to enhance the performance of a program, in
our implementation it is used only as an obfuscation technique. Multithreading, as imple-
mented, signiﬁcantly enhances the programs resilience against dynamic analysis attacks
but it also slows down the resulting program because of the following reasons:
1. The threads are essentially executed in sequence as the key stream value is evaluated
only within a critical section. Therefore, when this section is in use by a given thread,
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other threads remain idle.
2. The use of a critical section introduces an additional overhead. Furthermore, as the
design of RC4 dictates, only a single index can be evaluated at a time, which offers
no room for parallelism.
3. Threads that do not implement the switch/case statement for the given value of the
index i introduce an additional delay. These threads lock the critical section and
consequently prevent other threads from operation and, yet, produce no keystream
words.
4.3.2 Excessive Use of Context Switches
The proposed implementation extensively uses branch statements to switch between real
and dummy functionality. This context switching introduces a delay since each switch/case
structure is evaluated before the real functionality is executed. In addition, each function,
whether dummy or real, introduces further delay as its parameters have to be pushed or
pulled from the stack. Furthermore, due to the use of arrays of function pointers, in each
iteration, two additional functions have to be handled.
4.3.3 Additional Calculations Overhead
Many mathematical calculations are required to obfuscate the value of j and the array
indices. This includes the additional calculations used to obfuscate the index pointer j.
Furthermore, when obfuscating the order of arrays by changing their dimensions, additional
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Figure 6: The implementation of the PRGA when replacing the array data structure by
independent variables
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Figure 9: Implementing the PRGA using multithreading
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Summary and Conclusions
Many computer systems and applications store working copies of sensitive data in the mem-
ory where they remain in cleartext even after their usage. Storing sensitive data unprotected
in the memory makes them prone to attacks in scenarios where attackers have access to the
memory content or even a corrupted version of this content.
In the ﬁrst part of our work, we investigated the suitability of two off-the-shelf algebraic
tools (CryptoMiniSat and PolyBoRi) for extraction of cryptographic keys from corrupted
memory images. Based on our experimental results, it is clear that while the CryptoMiniSat
requires a slightly longer preprocessing step to prepare its input ﬁle, this step is done only
once and the tool runs much faster than the Gröbner basis tool, PolyBoRi. Furthermore,
CryptoMiniSat does not require a large amount of memory during run time. However, if
several solutions were possible for the SAT problem in question, only one result is returned
by the solver and the additional solutions have to be explicitly searched again by re-running
the tool after appending some extra constraints to exclude already found solutions. On the
other hand, Gröbner basis returns a general form representing all possible solutions. How-
ever, PolyBoRi requires large memory and usually crashes when the memory requirements
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is exceeded which limits its applications for solving large problems. It should also be noted
that, given the high redundancy of the key schedules of the considered ciphers, the advan-
tage of being able to return all possible solutions does not seem to be very signiﬁcant since
in all the instances we considered, only one possible solution exists.
In the second part of our work, we investigated and compared different practical ob-
fuscation techniques for the protection of the RC4 implementations in the white-box attack
model. Our obfuscated implementation of RC4 provides a high degree of resiliency against
attacks from the execution environment where the adversary has access to the software im-
plementation such as digital right management applications. Furthermore, while the focus
of this work was RC4, these techniques can be applied to other array-based stream ciphers
such as HC-128, HC-256 and GGHN.
5.2 Future Work
While the use of algebraic tools automate the process of solving the system of equations re-
quired by the cold boot attack process, producing and pre-processing of these equations are
still very tedious tasks that are prone to errors if performed by a non-specialist. Automating
this part of the process using a tool with a suitable GUI (e.g., one that allows the user to
draw the key schedule using drag-and-drop of different components such as s-boxes, bit
rotation, bit shift, bit permutation, XOR module, linear transformation, modular addition,
modular subtraction, modular multiplication, ﬁnite ﬁeld operations as well other possible
user deﬁned modules) would be of a great help to the forensics community.
Providing a white box implementation with more theoretical foundations for different
cryptographic primitives, including RC4, is an interesting research problem. Exploring
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